Anything goes with heterogeneous, but not with homogeneous oligopoly by Furth, D.
Anything goes with heterogeneous,





Corch￿n and Mas￿ Colell (1996) showed that in heterogeneous oligopoly
(almost) everything is possible. Here it is shown that in order to obtain
a similar result for homogeneous oligopoly, the reaction correspondences
should ful￿ll a special condition.
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1 Introduction
Half way the twentieth century economic theory was interested in the answers
of the following three questions.
￿ Does an equilibrium exist?
￿ If it exists, is it stable?
￿ If it exists, is it unique?
There have always been economists believing the answer to all three ques-
tions should be Yes!
In General Equilibrium Theory (GET) rigorous proofs of existence were
given by Arrow and Debreu [2] and McKenzie [21]. Their proofs depend on a
number of, by now, standard conditions and one may ￿nd examples of non￿
existence of an equilibrium when these conditions are not ful￿lled. In economic
theory, stable means mostly stable in the sense of Liapunov and attracting. In
[35] Scarf gave two examples of equilibria in an exchange economy. In the ￿rst
example the equilibrium is stable in the sense of Liapunov but not attracting.
All orbits di⁄erent from the equilibrium are cycles. The equilibrium is a so
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1called center1 In Scarf￿ s second example the equilibrium is unstable, in fact a
spiral source, and there is an attracting limit cycle. Finally, Debreu [8] deals
with economies with a ￿nite number of equilibria. So, at least for GET, the
answer to all three of the above questions is No!.
These answers raised the question: Do Walras identity and continuity char-
acterize the class of community excess demand functions? (See Sonnenschein
[39]). Or phrased di⁄erent: what is possible for equilibria in GET? The answer
was given by Debreu [9] and Mantel [19]: ￿everything is possible,￿sometimes
formulated as: ￿anything goes.￿
Also with respect to oligopoly the answer to all three questions should be No.
McManus [22] and Roberts and Sonnenschein [34] gave examples of oligopolies
without an equilibrium. On this point see also [10, p. 67￿ 69]. The ￿rst one to
question the problem of stability was Theocharis who, in his seminal paper [40],
showed that with a linear inverse demand function and a linear cost function,
the (unique) Cournot equilibrium is stable when there are only two ￿rms and
unstable when there are four or more ￿rms. When there are three ￿rms, the
equilibrium is stable in the sense of Liapunov, but not attracting. The instability
was shown for a discrete Cournot t￿tonnement process. In [11] and [3], as far
as I know, for the ￿rst time in English, the possibility of multiple equilibria was
mentioned.2 In [11] it was shown that the questions about ￿ uniqueness￿and
￿ stability￿are related to each other. When there is more than one equilibrium,
at least one of them is not stable.
In Furth [11] ￿stability and instability￿for a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly
model and a heterogeneous Bertrand oligopoly model was studied. In the homo-
geneous case there was a clear picture what was possible, but the heterogeneous
model had many more possibilities. Stability of an equilibrium is always related
to some dynamical (adjustment) process: the Cournot t￿tonnement process.
By studying dynamical systems, one always can choose between: (i) continuous
dynamics; and: (ii) discrete dynamics. Here there has been chosen for the ￿rst,
hence continuous time. In oligopoly theory one may choose between: (i) best
reply dynamics and: (ii) gradient dynamics, see Corch￿n [5, p. 16].
An ￿ Anything goes￿ ￿ result for heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly
was derived by Corch￿n and Mas￿ Colell [6]. In section 3 it will be shown that
such a result can not always be derived for a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly.
This explains why in [11] I did not have a complete picture of the heterogeneous
case. Normally one starts with an oligopoly, given by inverse demand￿and cost
functions and derives the reaction correspondences or the ￿marginal payo⁄￿
function from it. The reaction correspondence leads to best response dynamics,
the marginal payo⁄ function to gradient dynamics. Corch￿n and Mas￿ Colell
start with arbitrary functions and show that one may ￿nd inverse demand￿and
cost functions such that the arbitrary functions are either the reaction functions
1See for the standard terminology Hirsch and Smale [16].
2Puu, in the introductory ￿rst chapter of [32], mentions a paper by Paleander ([29]) from
1939, in which Paleander showed the possibility of multiple equilibria. Unfortunately that
paper is in Swedish. In later papers Puu also claims that Paleander was also the ￿rst to write
about (in)stability in oligopoly.
2or the marginal payo⁄ functions of the oligopoly characterized by these inverse
demand￿and cost functions.
Corch￿n [5, proposition 1.1 page 11￿ 12] shows that with an arbritrary set
of strictly decreasing functions, one may ￿nd an inverse demand function and
cost functions, such that the homogeneous Cournot oligopoly characterized by
these functions have the functions one started with as best response functions.
The Corch￿n and Mas￿ Colell [6] result was derived for Bertrand oligopoly,
but the derivation is similar for Cournot oligopoly. It will be shown that
their result only holds for heterogeneous oligopoly, both Cournot and Bertrand.
There is much literature on the comparison of the equilibria in (heterogeneous)
Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, see [15, 36, 4, 42, 28, 1]. As the Corch￿n
and Mas￿ Colell [6] does not always hold for homogeneous oligopoly, in the
present paper a comparison will be made between homogeneous and hetero-
geneous Cournot oligopoly. Tirole [41] considered the outcome of the homoge-
neous Bertrand oligopoly model as paradoxical. Reason enough for paying no
attention to that model here. Those interested in a comparison of the equilibria
in homogeneous Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly are referred to [7].
With an ￿ anything goes￿result, one may try to construct oligopoly models
with (i) multiple equilibria; (ii) unstable equilibria; and (ii) all kinds of dy-
namics, for instance chaotic dynamics or (limit) cycles. I have some examples
of, what goes in heterogeneous Cournot oligopoly, does not always go for the
homogeneous case.
A remark should be made here. The ￿ anything goes￿results both in GET
and oligopoly may lead to pathological cases. Although they may have little
attraction to an economist, they can not be excluded on economic grounds.
When one starts with ￿ strange￿reaction functions or ￿ strange￿marginal payo⁄
functions, one may expect ￿ strange￿results. But there is no reason why one
should not study such strange, pathological cases. Forewarned is forearmed!
The ￿rst to show that chaos is possible in an duopoly model was Rand [33].
In one of Rand￿ s examples, the reaction functions are unimodular. Rand as-
sumes that, in a duopoly, such a reaction function can be obtained from the
￿ utility￿functions of the two ￿rms. As Rand considers the case of no costs, this
utility is in fact the revenue of the ￿rm. Revenue is equal to the quantity sold
times a market clearing price. The market clearing price is, through the inverse
demand a function of the total quantity sold. Hence Rand￿ s result applies to
homogeneous duopoly.
Following the Corch￿n and Mas￿ Colell procedure, indeed from a pair of uni-
modular functions one may ￿nd inverse demand functions, such that assuming
these inverse demand functions and no costs will, for a duopoly, raise to the
assumed functions as reaction functions. However the inverse demand functions
give the prices of the commodities sold as function of both the quantities sold,
not necessarily of the sum of the quantities sold. Hence the prices of the two
brands may be di⁄erent. The Corch￿n Mas￿ Colell result is one for heteroge-
neous oligopoly. In section 3 it will be shown that such a result can not be
derived for a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly.
3In section 2 ￿rst the oligopoly model is introduced. Section 3 proves the
Corch￿n and Mas￿ Colell result for heterogeneous Cournot oligopoly. To derive
the same result for homogeneous Cournot oligopoly, some extra conditions are
needed. It will be shown that these conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for
gradient dynamics, but only su¢ cient for best response dynamics. Many of the
result of this paper heavily depend on the application of ￿ Morse Theory￿ . In an
appendix therefor a ￿ rapid course￿in this theory is given.
2 Cournot Oligopoly models
In this section it will be assumed that all functions are C2, that is the functions
itself and their (partial) derivatives of the ￿rst and second order are continuous.
As most functions in this paper are de￿ned on closed sets, say S, derivatives
at the boundary of S are not de￿ned. It will be assumed that the functions
are the restrictions to S of C2￿ functions de￿ned on an open neighborhood of
S. The derivatives of the restrictions in boundary points of S are taken to be
equal to the derivatives of the extensions in these points.
Let either I = [0;M] with a certain 0 < M < 1, or I = R+, so always
0 2 I. In the sequel the following notations will be used. x := (x1;:::;xn) 2 In
and for all i 2 N := f1;:::;ng the notations
x￿i := (x1;:::;xi￿1;xi+1;:::;xn) 2 In￿1
and
(xi;x￿i) := x:
Similar notations will be used with p (prices) in stead of x (quantities) and
for vector valued functions f = (f1;:::;fn): U(￿ Rn) ! Rn. Also de￿ne
X :=
Pn
j=1 xj and X￿i :=
Pn
j=1;j6=i xj.
There are n(￿ 2) ￿rms, each supplies a di⁄erent good on an oligopolistic
market. Let xi 2 I be the quantity of the good supplied by ￿rm i 2 N. In
heterogeneous Cournot oligopoly each ￿rm i 2 N has a function
fi: In ! R+:
For x = (x1;:::;xn) 2 In, pi = fi(x1;:::;xn) is called the market clearing
price and the function fi the market clearing price function. When the market
clearing price functions f = (f1;:::;fn): In ! f(In)(￿ Rn) do have an inverse,
these inverse functions will be the demand functions Di(p1;:::;pn). Each Di
gives the demand in market i as a function of all (market) prices. In that case
the fi are the inverses of the demand functions. However, the possibility that
the inverse functions of fi do not exist is not excluded. Even when the functions
fi do not have an inverse, by abuse of language, they will be called the inverse
demand functions.
4In homogeneous oligopoly there is just one market clearing price and so there
is only one inverse demand function:








xi j xi 2 I for all i 2 N
)
:
The market clearing price p = f(X) is a function of total supply. In the sequel
also the notation J￿1 := (n ￿ 1)I =
nPn
j=1;j6=i xj j xj 2 I
o
will be used.
In heterogeneous as well in homogeneous oligopoly, let Ci: I ! R+ be the
cost function of ￿rm i, who￿ s costs are Ci = Ci(xi). Without too much loss of
generality, it will mostly be assumed that Ci(0) = 0.
Oligopoly is fully characterized by the inverse demand function(s) and the
cost functions. With these functions, in heterogeneous oligopoly pro￿ts of ￿rm
i are given by
￿i(x) = xifi(x) ￿ Ci(xi);
while in homogeneous oligopoly, these pro￿ts are
￿i(x) = xif(X) ￿ Ci(xi):
Firms will choose their output xi, given the output of their rival x￿i, such as





In this P(I) is the power set of I, i.e. the set of all subsets of I. It should be
clear that for homogeneous oligopoly Ri(x￿i) is in fact Ri(X￿i), with Ri: J￿1 !
P(I).
The reaction correspondences de￿ne a correspondence R: In ! P(In) that,
for heterogeneous oligopoly, maps
x 7! R(x) := R1(x￿1) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ Rn(x￿n)
and for homogeneous oligopoly
x 7! R(x) := R1(X￿1) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ Rn(X￿n):
De￿nition 2.1 A Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium x￿ 2 In of an oligopoly is a ￿xed
point of the map R. That is x￿ 2 R(x￿).
x￿ is a ￿xed point of R means for heterogeneous oligopoly, that x￿
i 2 Ri(x￿
￿i)
for all i, and for homogeneous oligopoly that x￿
i 2 Ri(X￿
￿i) for all i.






5Consider the vector￿eld3 ’: In ! Rn, with
’(x) = (’1(x1;x￿1);:::;’n(xn;x￿n)):
Firms will choose their output, given the output of their rival, such as (lo-
cally) to maximize pro￿ts. The ￿rst order condition (from now on FOC) of a
pro￿t maximizing ￿rm i reads
’i(xi;x￿i) = 0:
A solution x￿ of the equation ’(x) = 0 is called a zero or a singularity of the
vector￿eld ’.
De￿nition 2.2 A singularity x￿ of the vector￿eld ’ is called (linearly) stable,




have negative real parts.
The above de￿nition of stability is convienient for the present paper. A
mathematically ￿ correct￿de￿nition of (asymptotically) stability can be found
for instance in Hirsch and Smale [16]. The property of the eigenvalues follows
from the ￿ correct￿de￿nition.
The ￿rst order conditions (from now on the FOC￿ s) of a pro￿t maximizing
￿rm i read
’i(xi;x￿i) = 0:
So a Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium x￿ is a singularity of the vector￿eld ’. A
Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium that not only ful￿lls the FOC￿ s,
but also the Second Order Conditions (from now on SOC￿ s). The SOC￿ s require




that is the diagonal elements of the Jacobi matrix J(’(x￿)) are negative. So
in a Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium, each ￿rm is locally maximizing its pro￿ts. The
set of Cournot￿ Nash equilibria is a subset of the set of singularities.
In the introduction it was mentioned that stability of an equilibrium is al-
ways related to some dynamical (adjustment) process. By studying dynamical
systems, one always can choose between: (i) continuous dynamics; and: (ii)
discrete dynamics. In this paper there has been chosen for the ￿rst, hence
continuous time. In oligopoly theory one may choose between:
(a) best reply dynamics, which is de￿ned by the following set of di⁄erential
equations:4 5
_ xi = Ri(x￿i) ￿ xi for all i; and:
3See the appendix on some mathematical notions.
4A dot above a variable denotes the derivative with respect to time t.
5In de￿ning the best reply dynamics, it has been assumed that the reaction correspondences
are singleton valued, hence in fact functions.
6(b) gradient dynamics de￿ned by:
_ xi = ￿i’i(xi;x￿i) for all i;
where ￿i > 0 for each i. Di⁄erent ￿i￿ s represent a di⁄erent adjustment
speed. However in the sequel (without loss of generality) it will be assumed
that all ￿i = 1.
The RHS (right hand sides) of the di⁄erential equations of the gradient dy-
namics, represents the vector￿eld ’ := (’1;:::;’n): In ! Rn. This vector￿eld
maps x 2 In onto (’1(x1;x￿1);:::;’n(xn;x￿n)).





￿i) = 0. With best reply dynamics ￿rm i
will increase its output xi whenever xi < Ri(x￿
￿i) and with gradient dynamics
whenever ’i(xi;x￿
￿i) > 0.
Lemma 2.1 When @
@xi’i(x￿
i;x￿
￿i) < 0 and xi is in (a su¢ cient small) neigh-
borhood of x￿
i, then xi < Ri(x￿
￿i) if and only if ’i(xi;x￿
￿i) > 0.
Proof:














where ￿i = ￿xi + (1 ￿ ￿)Ri(x￿
￿i) for a certain 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
As
@’i
@xi is continuous, there is an " > 0 such that @
@xi’i(xi;x￿
￿i) < 0 whenever
jxi ￿ x￿
ij < ". As when jxi ￿ x￿
ij < ", also j￿i ￿ x￿
ij = ￿jxi ￿ x￿
ij < ". From this
the conclusion of the lemma follows. ￿
The conclusion is when xi > Ri(x￿
￿i) and ’i(xi;x￿
￿i) > 0 hold simultane-
ously, the dynamical system is not the gradient and/or best response dynamics
of some oligopoly model.
3 Anything goes in heterogeneous, but not in
homogeneous oligopoly.
First the Corch￿n and Mas￿ Colell result is derived.
Proposition 3.1 Let for i = 1;:::;n be given the C2￿ functions
’i: In ! R:
Then there exist inverse demand functions fi and cost functions Ci, such that
the functions ’i are the marginal payo⁄ functions of the oligopoly de￿ned by fi
and Ci.

















xi￿i(xi;x￿i); if xi 6= 0;
’i(0;x￿i); if xi = 0: ￿
Corollary 3.2 Let for i = 1;:::;n be given the C2￿ functions
Ri: In￿1 ! I:
Then there exist inverse demand functions fi and cost functions Ci, such that
the functions Ri are the reaction functions of the oligopoly de￿ned by fi and Ci.
Proof: Choose
’i(xi;x￿i) = Ri(x￿i) ￿ xi
and apply Proposition 3.1. ￿
The reason to give the proof of Proposition 3.1 is twofold. First: the proof
by Corch￿n and Mas￿ Colell is for heterogeneous Bertrand oligopoly, while the
(almost identical) proof given here is for heterogeneous Cournot oligopoly. And
second: the functions ￿ introduced in the proof are needed again in the proof
of Proposition 3.4.
The proof of the following theorem, that deals with homogeneous Cournot
oligopoly, can be found in Corch￿n [5, Proposition 1.1].
Proposition 3.3 Let for i = 1;:::;n be given the C2￿ functions
Ri: J￿1 ! I:
When the functions Ri are strictly decreasing (R0
i(X￿i) < 0), then there exist
an inverse demand function f and cost functions Ci, such that the functions Ri
are the reaction functions of the oligopoly de￿ned by f and Ci. ￿
In the introduction it was mentioned that Rand￿ s ([33]) example used uni-
modular reaction functions. These are de￿ned as follows. Assume that for
i = 1;2 the reaction functions Ri are de￿ned on a closed interval I = [0;M].
Such a reaction function R is called unimodular when R(0) = R(M) = 0,
R(x) ￿ 0 and there is a unique ￿ 2< 0;M > such that R0(￿) = 0. To indicate
the dependence of ￿ of the reaction function R, it will be noted by ￿(R).
8Example 3.1 With M = 1 the logistic maps Ri(xj) = ￿xj(1 ￿ xj), for i and
j = 1;2 but j 6= i, are unimodular reaction functions with ￿(Ri) = 1=2. When
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 Ri: I ! I.
Applying Corollary 3.2, one may ￿nd inverse demand functions




It will be shown that, in order to ￿nd an inverse demand function for a
homogeneous oligopoly, the marginal payo⁄ functions and the reaction func-
tions should ful￿ll a special condition. The unimodular reaction functions of
Example 3.1 do not ful￿ll this condition.
For homogeneous Cournot oligopoly one has:
’i(xi;x￿i) = f(X) + xif0(X) ￿ C0
i(xi):
As the inverse demand function f is a function of X, de￿ne g: In ! R+ by





In homogeneous oligopoly the partial derivatives of g with respect to all xi, are
necessarily the same.
Next we derive the special conditions on ’i such that we may ￿nd an inverse





As in the heterogeneous case one may derive
f(xi + X￿i) =
(
1
xi [Ci(xi) + ￿i(x;x￿i)]; if xi 6= 0;
C0
i(0) + ’i(0;x￿i); if xi = 0:
(3.1)
Let ACi(xi) be the average costs of ￿rm i. Then
















The ￿rst line of equation (3.2) holds for all i = 1;:::;n. The second line holds for































The last of these equations is the special condition on the marginal payo⁄ func-
tions. This condition is necessary, the next proposition shows it is also su¢ cient.
Proposition 3.4 Let for i = 1;:::;n be given the C2￿ functions
’i: In ! R:
Let ￿i be de￿ned as in the proof of Proposition 3.1.










holds, there exist an inverse demand functions f and cost functions Ci, such
that the homogeneous oligopoly de￿ned by these functions has the functions ’i
as its marginal payo⁄ functions.

































In fact in Proposition 3.4 and in its proof, everywhere x￿i may be replaced
by X￿i. This is as all functions in n variables, such as ’i, ￿i and ￿i, are in
fact functions in 2 variables xi and X￿i. This remark is already taken care of
in the following corollary.
10Corollary 3.5 Let for i = 1;:::;n be given the C2￿ functions
Ri: J￿1 ! I:




holds, there exist an inverse demand functions f and cost functions Ci, such
that the homogeneous oligopoly de￿ned by these functions has the functions Ri
as the reaction functions.
Proof: As in Corollary 3.2, let
’i(xi;X￿i) = Ri(X￿i) ￿ xi:
These ’i ful￿ll the conditions of Proposition 3.4. ￿
Example 3.2 This example is a continuation of Example 3.1. As in that ex-
ample a duopoly model is considered where the reaction functions are the uni-
modular functions Ri(xj) = ￿xj(1 ￿ xj). One has
R0
i(xj) = ￿(1 ￿ 2xj) 6= ￿(1 ￿ 2xi) = R0
j(xi):
The conditions of Corollary 3.5 are not ful￿lled. ￿
The conditions on the marginal payo⁄functions are necessary and su¢ cient.
The conditions on the reaction functions are only su¢ cient. This is demon-
strated in the following example.
Example 3.3 (Puu [31]) Also this example is an example of a duopoly. Let
I = [0;M] where M = 1





￿ ￿ ￿ xj:
One easily shows that R0
i(xj) 6= R0
j(xi) and the reaction functions do not ful￿ll
the conditions of Corollary 3.5.
However Puu derives these reaction functions from a homogeneous oligopoly
model with
f(x1 + x2) =
1
￿ + x1 + x2
;
and Ci(xi) = cxi.
For this duopoly model
’i(xi;xj) =
￿ + xj












That is the marginal payo⁄ functions do ful￿ll the conditions of Proposition 3.4. ￿
11Example 3.4 Also this example is an example of a duopoly. Choose I = [0;1].
De￿ne












The conditions of Proposition 3.4 are ful￿lled and there are an inverse demand
function f and cost functions Ci. One ￿nds










f(x1 + x2) = ￿ ￿ x1 ￿ x2:
In this ￿ is an integration constant that should be taken large enough in order
to make the market clearing price positive for a su¢ cient broad range of x1 and
x2. ￿
Notice that in Example 3.4 when 0 ￿ xj < ￿=4, ￿rm i may choose two values
for xi. In both points (x1;x2) the FOC (for ￿rm i) are ful￿lled, however only in
one of the two points also the SOC hold. When 2 < ￿ ￿ 4 there may be three
equilibria, with x1 and x2 > 0. Only one of these three equilibria, the one for
which x1 = x2 = 1 ￿ 1
￿ is a Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium. When 0 < ￿ < 2, there
is only one equilibrium, the one for which x1 = x2 = 1￿ 1
￿, but this equilibrium
is not a Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium.
4 Stability and (limit) cycles
4.1 Stability
Consider a heterogeneous Cournot oligopoly de￿ned by inverse demand func-
tions fi and cost functions Ci. A homogeneous Cournot oligopoly will be con-
sidered as a heterogeneous one in which for all i one has fi(xi;x￿i) = f(X).
The vector￿eld ’ := (’1;:::;’n): In ! Rn maps x 2 In onto
(’1(x1;x￿1);:::;’n(xn;x￿n)):
In this section there has been chosen for I = [0;M]. Boundary points of In
are points (x1;:::;xn) for which there exists at least one i = 1;:::;n such that
either xi = 0 or xi = M. The vector￿eld ’ is said to be inwards pointing at the
boundary of In, when
’i(xi;x￿i)
(
> 0; if xi = 0;





be the obvious Jacobi matrix.
Assume the vector￿eld ’
(i) is a Morse￿ Smale vector￿eld (see the appendix for the de￿nition);
(ii) points inwards at the boundary of In;
(iii) has no cycles as integral curves.
Let cj be the number of critical points of ’ with Morse coindex j. So c0
is the number of stable critical points, cn the number of totally unstable ones.
Now the following Morse inequalities hold.
c0 ￿ 1
c1 ￿ c0 ￿ ￿1
. . .
cn ￿ cn￿1 + cn￿2 + ￿￿￿ + (￿1)nc0 ￿ (￿1)n:
The last inequality is in fact an equality.
For each (c0;c1;:::;cn) 2 Z
n+1
+ ful￿lling the Morse inequalities, one may ￿nd
a Morse￿ Smale vector￿eld ’ with
Pn
‘=0 c‘ non￿ degenerate equilibrium points,
such that there are precisely cj points with Morse coindex j. From Proposi-
tion 3.1 it follows that there are inverse demand functions fi and cost functions
Ci such that the functions ’i are the marginal payo⁄ functions of the heteroge-
neous oligopoly de￿ned by these inverse demand functions and cost functions. In
[11] for instance, there was an example of a heterogeneous Bertrand duopoly for
which c0 = 4, c1 = 4 and c2 = 1. So (almost) anything goes for heterogeneous
oligopoly. What about homogeneous oligopoly?






f0(X) + xif00(X); when j 6= i;
2f0(X) + xif00(X) ￿ C00
i (xi); when j = i
the Jacobi matrix can be written as the sum of a diagonal matrix, with f0￿C00
i on
the diagonal and a matrix of rank 1, in which the ith row is given by f0+xif00. In
Furth and Sierksma [12] such matrices are called M1￿ matrices. The eigenvalues
of such matrices are all real. Moreover one may say something on the sign
of these eigenvalues. Assume that at an equilibrium for all i it is true that
f0 ￿ C00
i < 0, which is a generally made assumption.
Proposition 4.1 Let a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly be given by the inverse
demand function f and for i = 1;:::;n cost functions Ci. When f0 ￿ C00
i < 0




















then the Morse coindex of the equilibrium is 1 and the equilibrium is non
stable.
The proof of this proposition can be found in [11]. In case (i) of Proposi-
tion 4.1, all eigenvalues are negative, while in case (ii) all but one are negative,









has been excluded as in this case there is an eigenvalue zero and the equilibrium
is degenerate.
Proposition 4.1 shows that for a homogeneous oligopoly c2 = ￿￿￿ = cn = 0.
From the Morse inequalities follows that c0 ￿ 1, hence there is at least one
Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium, and that c1 ￿ 0. As the last Morse inequality is in
fact an equality, it follows from this equality that c0 = c1 +1. That is the total
number of equilibria c0 + c1 = 2c1 + 1 is odd.
From this one may conclude the following. For heterogeneous oligopoly,
almost everything is possible: stable, unstable and totally unstable equilibria, as
long as the Morse inequalities hold. For heterogeneous oligopoly the possibilities
are restricted. Only stable and unstable equilibria are possible, the unstable
equilibria have an unstable manifold of dimension 1. The number of stable
equilibria is one more than the number of unstable equilibria.
Example 4.1 Also this example is an example of a duopoly. Choose I = [0;M].
Let
’i(xi;xj) = ￿ ￿ 2￿xi ￿ ￿xj;
then
￿i(xi;xj) = (￿ ￿ ￿xi ￿ ￿xj)xi:
It is assumed that ￿, ￿, ￿ and M are positive numbers.
These ’i are the marginal payo⁄s of a heterogeneous duopoly with fi(xi;xj) =












14there must be an inverse demand function f and cost functions Ci, such that the
’i are the marginal payo⁄ functions of a homogeneous duopoly given by these
functions f and Ci. Clearly
f(x1 + x2) = ￿ ￿ ￿(x1 + x2); and
Ci(xi) = (￿ ￿ ￿)xi:













has two (real) eigenvalues ￿1 = ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ and ￿2 = ￿2￿ + ￿.
Both eigenvalues are negative when ￿ < 2￿. The equilibrium is stable in that
case. As the eigenvalues are not equal this is an example of a so called ￿ node￿ .
When ￿ > 2￿, the eigenvalue ￿1 is still negative, but ￿2 is positive. The
equilibrium is unstable in this case and an example of a so called ￿ saddle￿ . The
stable manifold, that corresponds to ￿1, is the line with equation y = x. The
unstable one, corresponding to the positive eigenvalue, is the line with equation
x1 + x2 = 2￿=(2￿ + ￿).
In the unstable example, there is just one unstable equilibrium. In terms
of the Morse indices c1 = 1. As the number of stable equilibria is one more
than the number of unstable equilibria, hence c0 = 2. What has gone wrong?
The answer is simple. the vector￿eld ’ is not pointing inwards at the boundary
of [0;M]2. This is so as the derivative of ’i with respect to xi is ￿2￿ always
negative. It should be positive when xi = 0. The two missing stable equilibria
are boundary equilibria: x￿
i = ￿=2￿ and x￿
j = 0. In these boundary equilibria,
one of the two ￿rms is a monopolist, while the other ￿rm is not active. ￿
4.2 (Limit) Cycles
Example 4.2 This example is a variant of Example 4.1. Also this is an exam-
ple of a duopoly. Choose I = [0;M]. Let
’1(x1;x2) = ￿ ￿ 2￿x1 ￿ ￿x2; and
’2(x1;x2) = ￿x1 + 2￿x2 ￿ ￿;
then
￿1(x1;x2) = (￿ ￿ ￿x1 ￿ ￿x2)x1; and












15Hence one can not ￿nd inverse demand functions f and cost functions Ci, such
that these ’￿ s are the marginal payo⁄ functions of the homogeneous oligopoly
de￿ned by these f and Ci￿ s.
However these ’i are the marginal payo⁄ functions of a heterogeneous duopoly
with
f1(x1;x2) = ￿ ￿ ￿x1 ￿ ￿x2; and
f2(x1;x2) = ￿x1 + ￿x2 ￿ ￿:
as inverse demand functions and Ci(xi) ￿ 0 as cost functions.























2 ￿ 4￿2; if 2￿ < ￿:
When ￿ < 2￿ the eigenvalues are of opposite sign and the equilibrium is
an unstable saddle. When ￿ > 2￿ the eigenvalues are pure imaginary. The
equilibrium is a so called ￿ center￿ .
For this example it is not too di¢ cult to ￿nd the equation of the integral




￿x1 + 2￿x2 ￿ ￿
2￿x1 + ￿x2 ￿ ￿
:
the solution is given by the following equation.
(2￿ + ￿)
￿




￿ (2￿ ￿ ￿)(x1 ￿ x2)2 = const: (4.1)
In this const is an integration constant, the value of which depends on the initial
conditions.
When ￿ < 2￿ the integral curves are hyperbolas, which of course they should
be when the equilibrium is a saddle. When ￿ > 2￿ the integral curves are
ellipses, hence cycles. ￿
In the introduction I forewarned that when one starts with strange marginal
payo⁄functions, one may get a strange oligopoly. In Example 4.2, in equilibrium
6In the following equation i is the complex number
p
￿1 and not the name of a ￿rm.
16the market clearing price of ￿rm 1 is positive, but that of ￿rm 2 is negative.
The reason of this to happen is that ￿rm 2 will increase its output whenever
’2(x1;x2) > 0, but in that case x2 > R2(x1). Lemma 2.1 does not hold for this
example! Sometimes the cases are too pathological, even for me. The reason to
consider this example is that it shows that with complex eigenvalues you may
have cycles and/or oscillating behavior.
Assume that for a Cournot duopoly the marginal payo⁄functions are linear.
Then there is a unique Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium x￿. The possible Cournot￿
Nash equilibria can be classi￿ed by the properties of the eigenvalues of the
Jacobi matrix.
A the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix are real,
(i) both eigenvalues are negative, then the equilibrium is stable;
(ii) one eigenvalue is negative, the other is positive, the equilibrium is a
saddle;
(iii) both eigenvalues are positive, the equilibrium is (totally) unstable;
B the eigenvalues are complex conjugated,
(iv) the real part of the eigenvalues is negative, then the equilibrium is
stable;
(v) the real part is zero;
(vi) the real part is positive, then the equilibrium is (totally) unstable.
In the case the eigenvalues are real and have the same sign, the equilibrium is
called a node when the eigenvalues are di⁄erent and a focus when the eigenvalues
are equal. The integral curves of the dynamical system approach the equilibrium
for t ! 1, when the equilibrium is stable and for t ! ￿1 when the equilibrium
is unstable.
When the eigenvalues are complex conjugated and the real part is not zero,
the integral curves are spiraling around the equilibrium. When the integral
curves approach the equilibrium for t ! 1, the equilibrium is stable and called
a spiraling sink. When the integral curves approach the equilibrium for t ! ￿1,
the equilibrium is unstable and called a spiraling source.
Finally, when the eigenvalues are pure imaginary, that is complex conjugated
but with a real part zero, the equilibrium is stable, but not attracting. All inte-
gral curves, except for the equilibrium, are closed cycles around the equilibrium.
The equilibrium is called a center in this case.
All the above is possible for heterogeneous Cournot duopoly, but not for
homogeneous Cournot duopoly, as in homogeneous Cournot duopoly all eigen-
values are real (see the remark just above Proposition 4.1).
Consider a duopoly, let Ri be the reaction function of ￿rm i and let x￿
be a (local) Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium. The best reply dynamics is given by
_ xi = Ri(xj) ￿ xi, for i;j = 1;2 but j 6= i. A theorem due to Hartman [14] says
17that a vector￿eld is locally equivalent to its linear part, as given by its Jacobi

























1) < 1, compare Example 4.1. One eigenvalue is negative and the




1) > 1, compare Example 4.2. Eigenval-




1) < 0, compare also Exam-
ple 4.2.
When both eigenvalues are negative, the Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium is a sink
and stable. According to Proposition 3.3, when we have two strictly decreasing
functions, there is a homogeneous Cournot Duopoly with these functions as
reaction functions. When one eigenvalue is positive and the other is negative, the
equilibrium is a saddle and unstable. When both eigenvalues are positive, the
equilibrium is a source and totally unstable When the eigenvalues are complex
conjugated, the real part of the eigenvalues is ￿1, which is negative, hence
the equilibrium is stable. In fact the integral curves are spiraling towards the
equilibrium, compare Example 4.3 below. In this case one reaction function is
(locally) decreasing, while the other is (locally) increasing.
Example 4.3 As Example 4.2 also this example is a variant of Example 4.1.
Choose I = [0;M]. Let
’1(x1;x2) = ￿ ￿ 2￿x1 ￿ ￿x2; and
’2(x1;x2) = ￿ + ￿x1 ￿ 2￿x2:
then
￿1(x1;x2) = (￿ ￿ ￿x1 ￿ ￿x2)x1; and












Hence one can not ￿nd inverse demand functions f and cost functions Ci, such
that these ’￿ s are the marginal payo⁄ functions of the homogeneous oligopoly
de￿ned by these f and Ci￿ s.
However these ’i are the marginal payo⁄ functions of a heterogeneous duopoly
with
f1(x1;x2) = ￿ ￿ ￿x1 ￿ ￿x2; and
f2(x1;x2) = ￿ + ￿x1 ￿ ￿x2:
as inverse demand functions and Ci(xi) ￿ 0 as cost functions.

















￿12 = ￿2￿ ￿ i￿;
where as before i is the complex number
p
￿1.
The eigenvalues are complex conjugated. As the real part of these eigenvalues
(2￿) is positive, the equilibrium is stable. In fact it is a so called spiral sink.
As in Example 4.2 it is not too di¢ cult to solve the di⁄erential equations.
One ￿nds
x1(t) = x￿
1 + ke￿2￿t cos(￿0 + ￿t); and
x2(t) = x￿
2 + ke￿2￿t sin(￿0 + ￿t):
In this k and ￿0 are integration constants, determined by the initial conditions.
It can (easily) be shown that k =
p
(x1(0) ￿ x￿
1)2 + (x2(0) ￿ x￿
2)2. When t !
1, xi(t) ! x￿
i for i = 1;2. Hence the integral curves are spiraling around the
equilibrium and they are approaching it. As there is just one stable equilibrium
c0 = 1 and c1 = c2 = 0, hence the Morse inequalities hold. ￿
For completeness also consider a duopoly with the features of Example 4.2.
The best reply dynamics is given by
_ x1 = R1(x2) ￿ x1; and
_ x2 = x2 ￿ R2(x1);
where Ri is the reaction function of ￿rm i. Let x￿ be a (local) Cournot￿ Nash




















1) < 1. In this case ￿1 = ￿￿2 and the equilibrium is a saddle.




1) > 1 and the equi-
librium is a center.
Let (x1;x2) be a point not on one of the two reaction curves. Both ￿rms
want to move towards their reaction curve. When the equilibrium is a sink, the
vector￿eld is pointing (more or less) in the direction towards the equilibrium.
19When the equilibrium is a saddle, in some points the vector￿eld is pointing to-
wards the equilibrium, but there are also points where the vector￿eld is pointing
away from the equilibrium.
Oscillating behavior for a duopoly is only possible either when one reaction
curve is (locally) increasing, while the other is (locally) decreasing, or when one
￿rm moves towards its reaction curve while the other moves away from it. In this
two cases there are complex conjugated eigenvalues with a non zero imaginary
part. As for homogeneous duopoly, the eigenvalues are always real, oscillating
behavior is not possible for homogeneous duopoly, but it may be possible for
heterogeneous duopoly.
Example 4.4 Consider The case that n = 2. For simplicity, write x for x1, y
for x2, ’(x;y) for ’1(x1;x2) and  (x;y) for ’2(x1;x2). Consider the following
dynamical system.
’(x;y) = y ￿ 2 + (x ￿ 2)[1 ￿ (x ￿ 2)2 ￿ (y ￿ 2)2];
 (x;y) = 2 ￿ x + (y ￿ 2)[1 ￿ (x ￿ 2)2 ￿ (y ￿ 2)2]:





1 ￿ 3(x ￿ 2)2 ￿ (y ￿ 2)2 1 ￿ 2(x ￿ 2)(y ￿ 2)
￿1 ￿ 2(x ￿ 2)(y ￿ 2) 1 ￿ (x ￿ 2)2 ￿ 3(y ￿ 2)2
￿
Let T be the trace of this matrix, D its determinant. By de￿ning ￿2 := (x ￿
2)2 + (y ￿ 2)2 one may calculate that
T := 2(1 ￿ 2￿2);
D := (3￿2 ￿ 1)(￿2 ￿ 1) + 1; and
(1=4)T2 ￿ D := ￿4 ￿ 1:
The eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix are ￿12 = (1=2)T ￿
p
(1=4)T2 ￿ D.
First notice that D ￿ 0 for all ￿. When 0 ￿ ￿2 < 1=2 T is positive T2￿4D is
negative. The eigenvalues are complex conjugated with positive real part. When
￿2 = 1=2 T = 0 and T2￿4D is negative. The eigenvalues are purely imaginary,
that is complex conjugated with real part zero. When 1=2 < ￿2 < 1 T and
T2 ￿ 4D are negative. The eigenvalues are complex conjugated with negative
real part. When ￿2 ￿ 1 the eigenvalues are real and negative.
The dynamical system is solved by going over on polar coordinates:
x = 2 + rcos(￿)
y = 2 + rsin(￿):
The solution is








20In this k is some integration constant,determined by the initial conditions.
One derives
￿2 = (x ￿ 2)2 + (y ￿ 2)2 =
1
1 + ke￿2t:
It follows: (i) that ￿2 ! 1 when t ! 1, (x ￿ 2)2 + (y ￿ 2)2 = 1 is the equation
of an attracting limit cycle; and: (ii) that ￿2 ! 0 when t ! ￿1, (x;y) = (2;2)
is a totally unstable (both eigenvalues have positive real part) equilibrium.
Is this dynamical system the gradient system of a Cournot duopoly? It follows
directly form Proposition 3.1 that there is a heterogeneous Cournot duopoly that
has (’; ) as gradient system. On easily derives that
￿(x;y) = (1=2)x2 + xy ￿ 4x ￿ (1=4)[x4 ￿ 8x3 + 24x2 ￿ 16x] ￿ (1=2)(x2 ￿ 4x)(y ￿ 2)2;
￿(x;y) = (1=2)y2 ￿ xy ￿ (1=2)(x ￿ 2)2(y2 ￿ 4y) ￿ (1=4)[y4 ￿ 8y3 + 24y2 ￿ 16y]:










and, according to Proposition 3.4, (’; ) is not the gradient system of a homo-
geneous Cournot duopoly. ￿
This example shows that a heterogeneous Cournot duopoly with a limit cycle
is possible. However it does not show that a homogeneous Cournot duopoly with
a limit cycle is impossible. In the example it was shown that when 0 ￿ ￿2 < 1=2
T is positive, when ￿2 = 1=2 T = 0 and when 1=2 < ￿2 < 1 T is negative. The
trace of the Jacobi matrix changing sign is a necessary condition for the existence
of a cycle. This follows from the Bendixson Theorem, see [18, Theorem 2.4]
Proposition 4.2 (Bendixson) Let (’1;’2) be a (smooth) vector￿eld de￿ned on






has the same sign throughout S, than the dynamical system de￿ned by this vec-
tor￿eld has no cycle lying entirely in S as a solution. ￿
Apply Proposition 4.1 to a duopoly. Then the eigenvalues of the Jacobi
matrix are either both negative, or one is negative and the other is positive.
Assume the following.
(i) f0 ￿ C00
i < 0 for i = 1;2;
(ii) f0 + x1f00 ￿ f0 + x2f00,
Notice that the SOC implies that
2f0 + xif00 ￿ C00
i < 0;
21that is although f0+xif00 may be positive it should be smaller than ￿(f0￿C00
i ).
It can be shown that the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix are
￿1 = f0 + x1f00 + (f0 ￿ C00
1) + (f0 ￿ C00
2)
￿2 = f0 + x2f00:
In [12] it was shown that
￿1 < f0 + x1f00 ￿ ￿2:
When f0 + x2f00 < 0 both eigenvalues are negative. As the trace of the Jacobi
matrix is equal to the sum of the eigenvalues, also this trace is negative. When
one eigenvalue is positive, this should be ￿2 = f0 + x2f00. The sum of the
eigenvalues is
f0 + x1f00 + (f0 ￿ C00
1) + (f0 ￿ C00
2) + f0 + x2f00 <
f0 + x1f00 + (f0 ￿ C00
1) + (f0 ￿ C00
2) ￿ (f0 ￿ C00
2) =
f0 + x1f00 + (f0 ￿ C00
1) < 0:
The inequalities, both in the ￿rst and the last line, follows from the SOC￿ s. In
all cases the sum of the eigenvalues, and therefor also the trace of the Jacobi
matrix, is negative. It now follows from the Bendixson Theorem that gradient
dynamics does not have a cycle as a solution.
So cycles are possible for heterogeneous Cournot duopoly, but not for homo-
geneous Cournot duopoly. Does this conclusion also hold when there are more
than two ￿rms? With a Hopf bifurcation a stable equilibrium turns into an
attracting (limit)cycle when a pair of complex conjugated eigenvalues cross the
imaginary ax. So a Hopf bifurcation is not possible in a homogeneous oligopoly.
Said di⁄erently, in homogeneous Cournot oligopoly the existence of a (limit)
cycle can not be due to a Hopf bifurcation. But does this exclude cycles? I do
not know.
5 Conclusions
I would have liked to add a section on ￿ chaos￿in general and on ￿ strange at-
tractors￿in particular. Starting with the di⁄erential equations for the Lorentz
attractor, one may ￿nd a heterogeneous triopoly that has these di⁄erential equa-
tions as its gradient dynamics. One also can show that there is no homogeneous
triopoly, having the same gradient dynamics.
The exercise would not much di⁄er from Subsection 4.2. In Section 4 it
was shown that all kind of instabilities are possible in heterogeneous oligopoly,
but in an equilibrium of a homogeneous oligopoly, the dimension of the instable
manifold is at most one. So heterogeneous oligopoly has properties that are not
shared by homogeneous oligopoly. In Section 4.2 it was shown that oscillating
behavior and/or (limit) cycles are possible in heterogeneous duopoly, but not in
homogeneous duopoly. I would have liked to prove a similar result when there
22are more than two ￿rms, but I have not been able to derive such a result. Due to
the fact that I have not chosen for dynamics in discrete time, but for continuous
time, in order to have examples of ￿ strange attractors￿one needs at least three
￿rms and the case of more than two ￿rms turned out to be rather complicated.
So I did not investigate it, as my point:
Everything that is possible with heterogeneous oligopoly, is not al-
ways possible with homogeneous oligopoly,
has been made already.
A A rapid course in Morse theory
Good introductions to Morse theory are [23, 20]. It should be noted that all
results in this appendix are generic. That is the cases where the results do not
hold are rare. To give the intuition behind Morse theory, ￿rst a ￿ proof￿of the
following ￿ Theorem￿will be given.
Theorem A.1 Let be given an island. Let M be the number of mountains on
the island, V the number of valleys and P the number of passes. The following
equality holds:
M + V = P + 1:
￿ Proof￿ :
The proof is by induction on the number of mountains. When there is just
one mountain M = 1 and V = P = 0, such that the equation holds.
Suppose the equation holds for M = n. Add a mountain. There are two
possibilities.
(i) The new mountain ￿ touches￿precisely one other mountain. In that case not
only the number of mountains increases by one, but also the number of
passes. The ￿ new￿pass is between the two ￿ touching￿mountains. The
result is that the equality still holds.
(ii) The new mountain ￿ touches￿two other mountains. Again there are two
possibilities.
(a) The new mountain closes a chain of mountains, turning it into a cycle
of mountains. In this case the number of passes increases by two. But
the cycle now encloses a new valley. So the number of mountains and
the number of valleys increases by one, so the equality still holds.
(b) The new mountain divides the valley between the two other moun-
tains. Again the number of passes increases by two. The number of
valleys increases by one, as an existing valley now splits into two new
valleys. Again the equality holds. ￿
Corollary A.2 An island does have at least one mountain. ￿
23With respect to this ￿ Theorem￿ , there will follow now some remarks.
Remarks
1. To turn the ￿ Theorem￿into a mathematical result. Let C ￿ R2 be a
compact subset of the two dimensional Euclidian space. Let f : C ! R
be a continuous map. For the ￿ Theorem￿C is the island and f is the
￿ height￿function. That is f(x;y) is the height (above sea level) at location
(x;y) 2 C on the island. M corresponds to the number of maxima of f,
V to the number of minima and P to the number of saddles.










The gradient Df : C ! R2 de￿nes a vector in each point (x;y) 2 C.
The vector points into the direction of fastest increase. A maximum is
characterized as a point from where you go down in all directions. A
minimum is a point where you go up in all directions. Finally with a
saddle, in some directions you go up, while in other directions you go
down.
3. You may think that the induction in the proof of the theorem, could have
been started with one valley. However when you have an island with just
one valley (and no mountains or passes), once high tide and your island
will be gone. This of course is not a mathematical argument. When you
approach an island from sea, you will always go upwards, That is the
gradient ￿eld points inwards at the boundary (the beach) of the islands.
When there are no valleys and no passes, it follows from the equality
that there is precisely one mountain. This proves the corollary. It proves
more general: ￿When the gradient Df of f : C ! R points inwards at the
boundary of C, f has at least one maximum.￿
4. What about a volcano? Is that a mountain or a valley? Di¢ cult question,
when we assume that the points of the edge of the crater are all at the
same height. But fortunately, volcanos are mostly in regions where there
are frequently earthquakes. After such an earthquake, the edge of the
crater will be slightly tilted. As a consequence, one point of the edge will
be the highest point and another the lowest. The heigh point corresponds
to a maximum, because from it in each direction you go down. The low
point is a saddle, because along the edge of the crater you go up, but in
a traverse direction you go down. Finally the crater itself corresponds to
a minimum. So consider the volcano as a valley, but increase the number
of passes and mountains by one extra.
Let us try to formulate the above more general.
First one needs an n￿ dimensional equivalent of the 2￿ dimensional island.
This will be a simply connected region V , de￿ned in the following way. Let
24there be k functions ￿‘: Rn ! R with ‘ 2 K := f1;:::;kg. De￿ne for ‘ 2 K
V‘ := fx = (x1;:::;n) 2 Rn j ￿‘(x) ￿ 0g
and let V := \‘2KV‘. When the functions ￿‘ are quasi￿ concave, the sets V‘ and
V are convex and closed.7
Let U be an open neighborhood of V . Let
  = ( 1;:::; n): U ! Rn:
So   assigns to each point x 2 U a vector ( 1(x);:::; n(x)) 2 Rn. It will be
assumed that this is done in a smooth way. That means, it is assumed that the
functions  i have continuous (partial) derivatives of the ￿rst and the second
order.  : U ! Rn will be called a vector￿eld on U.
For each point x 2 V de￿ne the set
K(x) := fk 2 K j ￿k(x) = 0g:








The set V is called a regular region whenever the vectors
fD￿‘(x) j ‘ 2 K(x)g
are linearly independent.
Notice that for a regular region there can be at most n elements in K(x).
one says that a point x in a regular region V is
￿ an interior point when K(x) = ;;
￿ a boundary point when K(x) 6= ;;
￿ a corner when the number of elements in K(x) is precisely n.
@V is the set of all boundary points of V .
As the vectors
fD￿‘(x) j ‘ 2 K(x)g





A vector￿eld   de￿ned on U(￿ V ) is said to point inwards (resp. point out-
wards) at x 2 @V , when in equation (A.1) all ￿￿ s are positive (resp. negative).
7In the ￿ Theorem￿n = 2, V = C and C could be de￿ned by just one function, for instance
￿(x;y) = r2 ￿ x2 ￿ y2.
25A point x 2 @V is called a (+)￿ Kuhn￿ Tucker point (resp. a (￿)￿ Kuhn￿ Tucker
point) when in equation (A.1) all ￿￿ s are positive (resp. negative).





The set N in the following de￿nition is the set f1;:::;ng.
De￿nition A.1 1. x￿ = (x￿
1;:::;x￿
n) 2 U is called a singular point of the
vector￿eld   when for all i 2 N it is true that
 i(x￿) = 0:
2. A singular point x￿ of the vector￿eld   is called non￿ degenerate when
the Jacobi matrix J( )(x￿) is non￿ singular.
3. A non-degenerate singular point is stable when all eigenvalues of the
Jacobi matrix J( )(x￿) have negative real part.
4. A non-degenerate singular point is unstable when it is not stable.
5. A non-degenerate singular point is totally unstable when all eigenvalues
of the Jacobi matrix J( )(x￿) have positive real part.
6. The Morse coindex of a non￿ degenerate singular point x￿ is the number
of eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix J( )(x￿) with a positive real part.
When x￿ 2 U is
(i) a stable singular point, hence the Morse coindex is 0, it will be called a sink;
(ii) an unstable singular point, with Morse coindex 1 ￿ ‘ ￿ n ￿ 1, it will be
called a saddle;
(iii) a totally unstable singular point, hence the Morse coindex is n, it will be
called a source.
When the vector￿eld is in fact the gradient ￿eld of some function de￿ned on
V , sinks of the gradient ￿eld are maxima of that function, sources are minima
and saddles are of course saddles.
In De￿nition A.1 stability and instability is mentioned. Stability of a singular
point is always related to some dynamical (adjustment) process. By studying
dynamical systems, one always can choose between: (i) continuous dynamics
(i.e. given through a set of di⁄erential equations); and: (ii) discrete dynamics
(i.e. given through a set of di⁄erence equations). Here there has been chosen for
continuous time. The dynamical process with the vector￿eld   on U is given
through the di⁄erential equations9
_ xi =  i(x) for all i:
8Some authors call this matrix the Jacobian. Here the name Jacobian will be only used
for the determinant of the Jacobi matrix, of course only when this determinant exists.
9A dot above a symbol, such as x means that this x has been di⁄erentiated with respect
to time t.
26The solution of these di⁄erential equations is given as follows. For each
y = (y1;:::;yn) in the interior of U let be de￿ned a maximal interval J(y) ￿ R
with 0 2 J(y). When the di⁄erential equations have a solution, this solution
can be given as a map ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿n): J(y) ! U, such that for all t 2 J(y)
and all i 2 N one has
_ ￿i(t) = ’i(￿(t))
and ￿(0) = y.
￿(J(y)) ￿ U is called an integral curve through y. A cycle is a closed
integral curve. That is for a cycle ￿ ￿ U it holds that for all y 2 ￿ one has that
(i) J(y) = R;
(ii) there is a ￿ 2 R such that ￿(k￿) = y for all k 2 Z.
The smallest ￿ for which (ii) holds is called the period of ￿.
The following de￿nition is a technical one, in which not all notions are de-
￿ned. For the full de￿nition see Smale [37, 38] and /or Palis and De Melo [30].
The vector￿eld   de￿ned on U is a Morse Smale vector￿eld when
(i) it has a ￿nite number of critical elements, singular points and cycles, all
hyperbolic;
(ii) there are no saddle connections, integral curves that start and end in a
saddle.
A singular point x￿ of the vector￿eld   is hyperbolic, when the Jacobi matrix
J( )(x￿) does not have purely imaginary eigenvalues.
A nice vector￿eld on V (￿ U) is a Morse￿ Smale vector￿eld  : U ! Rn, that
points inwards at the boundary of V , and has no cycles as integral curves. For
a nice vector￿eld   one may proof the following (see Milnor [23] or Morse and
Cairns [25]).
Let cj be the number of (non degenerate) singular points of   with Morse
coindex j. So c0 is the number of stable singular points, cn the number of
totally unstable ones. For a nice vector￿eld we let mi = ci. The following
Morse inequalities hold.
m0 ￿ 1
m1 ￿ m0 ￿ ￿1
. . .
mn ￿ mn￿1 + mn￿2 + ￿￿￿ + (￿1)nm0 ￿ (￿1)n:
The last inequality is in fact an equality.10 Therfore one may write it as
m0 ￿ m1 + m2 ￿ ￿￿￿ + (￿1)nmn = 1;
10You should recognize, for n = 2, the equality of the ￿ Theorem￿in it.
27from which one derives m0+m2+￿￿￿ = 1+m1+m3+￿￿￿ and the total number
of singular points is odd:
Pn
‘=1 m‘ = 1 + 2(m1 + m3 + ￿￿￿).
For each (m0;m1;:::;mn) 2 Z
n+1
+ ful￿lling the Morse inequalities, one may
￿nd a nice vector￿eld   with
Pn
‘=0 m‘ non￿ degenerate singularities, such that
there are precisely mj points with Morse coindex j.
The above treatment of Morse theory di⁄ers in two respect with the usual
treatment.
Marston Morse￿ s book [24], in which he introduced Morse theory, is called:
￿The calculus of variations in the large.￿ In the beginning of the theory, the
main ￿eld of applications was physics. Now physicists are mainly interested in
minima and rarely in maxima. But economists are more interested in maxima
and rarely in minima. Classical Morse theory deals with the critical points of a
smooth real valued function f on some manifold M, or with the critical points
of a vector￿eld  . So in order to get results for maxima, one has to apply
classical Morse theory either to the critical points of the function ￿f or of the
vector￿eld ￿ . So the Morse coindex of a non￿ degenerate singular point x￿ of
the vector￿eld   is equal to the Morse index of x￿ of the vector￿eld ￿ . When
the vector￿eld   points inwards at x 2 @V , the vector￿eld ￿  points outwards
at x 2 @V .
The second di⁄erence is that Morse theory deals with functions or vector-
￿elds de￿ned on a general manifold, possibly with boundary, edges and corners,
see [17] or [11, Appendix B] for a de￿nition of a manifold with boundary, edges
and corners and [13] for Morse theory for functions or vector￿elds on such mani-
folds. For general manifolds the right hand sides of the Morse inequalities may
be di⁄erent. For instance, for the earth as a whole, the number of mountains
plus the number of valleys is two more than the total number of passes. It
should be understood that these numbers should include the number of moun-
tains, valleys and passes at the bottom of the sea. When there is a planet that
has the shape of a torus, the number of mountains plus the number of valleys
is equal to the number of passes.
There still remain two questions to be answered.
(i) What when the vector￿eld points outwards at some points of @V ?
(ii) What when the vector￿eld does have cycles?
In the ￿ Theorem￿it was seen that on an island the ￿rst does not hold, but
in general it may. Let x￿ 2 @V be a (￿)￿ Kuhn￿ Tucker point. For each point
x 2 V the set
K(x) := fk 2 K j ￿k(x) = 0g
was de￿ned. De￿ne the set
￿(x￿) := fx 2 V j ￿k(x) = 0 for all k 2 K(x￿)g:
￿(x￿) is called the stratum to which x￿ belongs. V is sometimes called a strati-
￿ed set. For each x 2 ￿(x￿) let ~  (x) be the (orthogonal) projection of  (x) on
Tx￿(x￿), the tangent space to the stratum ￿(x￿). The Morse index of x￿ is the
28number of eigenvalues with negative real part of the Jacobi matrix J(~  )(x￿).
The Morse coindex (of the (￿)￿ Kuhn￿ Tucker point x￿ 2 @V ) is de￿ned as
n￿the Morse index. Notice, that in general the dimension of the stratum is
smaller than n. When the dimension of the stratum is m(< n), the Jacobi
matrix J(~  )(x￿) is an m￿m matrix, not an n￿n matrix. Let cj be the num-
ber of (interior) points with Morse coindex equal to j, let aj be the number of
(￿)￿ Kuhn￿ Tucker points with Morse coindex equal to j and let mj = cj + aj,
then the Morse inequalities still hold, see [25].
In the ￿ Theorem￿it was seen how to solve in the presence of a volcano (cycle).
In general, let ￿ be a cycle of the vector￿eld  . A local cross section of ￿ is a
hypersurface ￿ of dimension n ￿ 1, through a point x￿ 2 ￿ and transverse all
integral curves in a neighborhood of ￿. That is when x 2 ￿ is in a neighborhood
U of x￿,  (x) is not tangent to ￿. Choose U small enough, such that x￿ is the
only intersection point of ￿ with ￿. The ￿rst return or PoincarØ map P : U ! ￿
is de￿ned as follows. Let x 2 U, then there is an integral curve through x.
Follow this integral curve till one intersects ￿ again. P(x) is de￿ned as this
second intersection point. So P de￿nes a dynamical system on ￿, however this
time in discrete time. A critical point of a dynamical system in continuous
time, is stable when all eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix have negative real
parts. A critical point of a dynamical system in discrete time, is stable when
all eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix J(P)(x￿) have a modulus (absolute value)
smaller than one. Notice that although J( )(x￿) is an n ￿ n matrix, J(P)(x￿)
is (n ￿ 1) ￿ (n ￿ 1).
Let ns be the number of eigenvalues of J(P)(x￿) with a modulus smaller
than one and nu the number of eigenvalues with a modulus larger than one.
When the cycle ￿ is hyperbolic, there is no eigenvalue with a modulus equal
to one. In that case ns + nu = n ￿ 1. ns (resp. nu) is the dimension of the
stable manifold (resp. unstable manifold) of x￿ and ns +1 (resp. nu +1) is the
dimension of the stable manifold (resp. unstable manifold) of ￿.
Now let   de￿ned on U be a Morse Smale vector￿eld that point inwards at
the boundary of the regular region and such that it has a ￿nite number of critical
elements, singular points and cycles, all hyperbolic. Let cj be the number of
critical points with Morse coindex equal to j, let bj be the number of cycles, for
which the unstable manifold has dimension j + 1, then the Morse inequalities
hold for mj = cj + bj + bj+1, see [37]. One should realize what this means.
Suppose one has a cycle for which the unstable manifold has dimension j + 1.
This cycle contributes 1 to mi with i = j, namely through bi+1 and 1 to mi
with i = j + 1, namely through bi.
Example, suppose we have a unique attracting cycle ￿ in the plane R2. By
the PoincarØ￿ Bendixson Theorem, see [16, Chapt. 10], there must be a critical
point, a source, in the interior of ￿. This critical point is the only point of Morse
coindex 2. Hence c0 = c1 = 0 and c2 = 1. For a point on the cycle we have
that ns = 1 and nu = 0. That is nu + 1 = 1. It follows that b0 = b1 = 1. So
￿nally m0 = b0 = 1, m1 = b1 = 1 and m2 = c2 = 1. This corresponds with our
￿ndings for a volcano.
It should be understood that in the most general case mi = ci+ai+bi+bi+1.
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